党的二十大报告提出,稳步扩大规则、规制、管理、标准等制度型开放。当前,我国对外开放逐渐由商品和要素流动型开放转向制度型开放,制度型开放的重心主要体现在规则、规制、管理、标准四个方面。规则领域的开放,主要是指与国际规则特别是高水平国际经贸规则对接;规制领域的开放,主要是指国家间法律法规的监管协调与一致性;管理,主要是指政府的行政服务效率对表国际先进水平;标准,主要是行业和产品标准的“引进来”和“走出去”。
高水平对外开放能否促进就业高质量发展是当下值得探讨的重要命题。文章使用熵权法测量省级层面就业质量,并探究双向投资对其产生的影响效应与门槛效应。研究表明:外商直接投资与就业质量呈“U”型关系;对外直接投资能够显著提升就业质量;双向投资对就业质量存在经济区位和前期就业质量水平上的异质性影响效应;城镇化、研发投入、人力资本、知识产权保护和金融发展水平不同,双向投资对就业质量呈差异化影响效应。根据研究结论,我国应当始终坚持高水平对外开放,按照经济区位、就业质量水平实施差异化投资战略,综合运用和发挥科技、社会条件的调节效应,以期实现就业高质量发展。
Objective Since 2016, the Chinese government has been piloting a public long-term care insurance (LTCI) scheme. This study examined whether the LTCI scheme reduced the use of informal care and how this has varied across income groups. Method We used data from the 2011, 2014, and 2018 waves of Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey, focusing on community-dwelling older adults aged 65 years and older. We used staggered difference-in-differences analyses with propensity score matching to examine the effects of the policy. Results The LTCI scheme reduced the probability and intensity of informal care use by 5.7% (p < .05) and 17.4% (p < .05), respectively. The policy impact was limited to older people in the middle-income group, reducing the probability and intensity of informal care use by 15.6% (p < .001) and 43.1% (p < .05), respectively. We did not find a statistically significant policy effect for older adults with high or low incomes. Conclusions The LTCI scheme had different effects on reducing the informal care burden for family caregivers by income level. We suggest that the scheme should entitle people with low incomes to a preferential co-payment rate, thereby enhancing their access to formal care.
摘要: Digital platforms commonly use monetary incentives to motivate users to perform specific tasks. Extant studies have shown the effects of introducing such monetary rewards on the outcomes of interest (e.g., participation and performance) on public platforms. However, little is known about the impact of canceling rewards (i.e., whether it simply reverses the effect of their introduction), and particularly less attention is paid to corporate platforms. Our study examines the impact of canceling monetary incentives using quasi-natural experiments on a corporate platform. Similar to prior studies focusing on public platforms, we find that introducing quantity-based monetary incentives increases participation (contribution quantity), but has no significant effect on performance (contribution quality). Yet, in contrast, our main empirical analysis reveals that canceling monetary incentives is not simply the reverse process of their introduction. In particular, compared with the increase in participation when monetary rewards were initially introduced, the cancellation of these rewards leads to a sharper decrease in participation. This suggests that canceling rewards has a net negative impact on participation. In addition, canceling monetary rewards also causes a significant decline in performance, which indicates that the effects of canceling and introducing rewards on performance are not simply the opposite of each other. Furthermore, we examine the heterogeneous responses of individuals with different self-motivation types and working competency levels to monetary incentives, highlighting the “asymmetry” between canceling and introducing incentives. We also discuss the similarities and differences between corporate and public platforms regarding the impact of monetary incentives. Our results provide important practical implications for enterprise information systems and general information systems regarding their design of platform strategies.